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1. A below-cost price for software products may very well be pro- rather than
anti-competitive. The long-term average incremental cost is a suitable benchmark to
assess the compatibility with the competition rules of the cost-price relationship of
software products.
2. Downgrading a software product into different versions and charging different
prices for each version is generally not anti-competitive. Such a practice reduces the
overall cost of the software and does not harm competition.
3. Resale price maintenance of software products shall usually not be considered
pro-competitive.
4. The prevailing competition analyses of exclusive dealing focus only on distribution
efficiency and tend to base the assessment of harm to competition on the market share
foreclosed. A better standard takes into account all kinds of efficiency and assesses
competitive harm on the basis of the amount of dealer compensation. This approach is
especially necessary in the software market.
5. Pricing restriction is a less-employed means of market power abuse in the software
market. Abuse is more likely to happen in non-pricing forms, e.g., by technically tying
application software to a dominant software platform.
6. The application of competition law in the Microsoft cases demonstrates how
traditional competition enforcement was challenged in the context of dynamic
competition. Generally, this enforcement conveys the correctness of flexible
enforcement of traditional competition rules.
7. Market power assessment should be based on multiple factors. The (2013) Qihoo v.
Tencent court decision confirms Kaplow’s assertion that estimating market power
based on a definition of the relevant market is misleading.
8. Compulsory disclosure of software interoperability information should be granted
only in exceptional occasions, because, as demonstrated in the Microsoft cases, this
remedy promotes competition in the application software market at the expense of
that in the platform software market.
9. It is generally necessary for developing jurisdictions to transplant competition rules
from developed jurisdictions. However, they cannot simply introduce foreign rules;
they must make sure these rules “fit” within their legal system.
10. Some abusive practices in the software market in developed jurisdictions have
been repeated in developing jurisdictions by the same dominant firms. Remedies
against such abusive practices should be designed to ensure that, to the greatest
possible extent, similar practices in other jurisdictions are prevented. Considering this
concern, it may be beneficial to consider other remedies, such as divesture and
criminal sanctions.
